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During the early years of the Emergency in Malaya the Colonial Secretary, 
Oliver Lyttelton (later Lord Chandos) received only one letter from the then Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery. It read: 
Dear Lyttelton 
Malaya. We must have a plan. Secondly, we must have a man. When 
we have a plan and a man, we shall succeed: not otherwise. 
Lyttelton remarked in his memoirs: "This had occurred to me."1 
It is relatively easy for historians to look back at the period of the 1950s and 
draw out the similarities, "Montgomery's plan" as it were, and the lessons to be 
learned; some are quite straightforward, others require a detailed comparison of the 
records over an extended period. The continuities may look obvious to a researcher 
in the reading room of the Public Record Office, but they were far less apparent those 
present at the scene of the conflict. Counterinsurgency, by its very nature, is a multi-
layered endeavor. The administration, military, colonial police and Special Branch, 
although all involved in the campaigns, all had their different perspectives and all 
had their own institutional memories. 
This article will briefly outline the course of events during the Mau Mau 
Emergency (1952-1956) and examine some of the instances when the experience 
of Malaya and other insurgencies was used and misused, and also when past 
experience required reshaping to meet the unique requirements of the conflict in 
Kenya. While the counterinsurgency campaign in Kenya appears to fall neatly in 
the post-1945 flow from Palestine to Malaya to Kenya to Cyprus and onward, the 
actual movement of ideas, strategies and tactics in and out of Kenya was, in fact, 
slow and uneven, as it was in campaigns both before and after. In this sense, Kenya 
is a convenient mid-point for observation as it was both a receiver and sender of 
experience along the British post-war counterinsurgency chain. 
Simply stated, support for the organization known as Mau Mau was linked 
to a series of long-standing Kikuyu grievances (both real and imagined) against the 
colonial government, focused primarily on the issues of land alienation and 
overcrowding in native areas. Moderate Kikuyu leaders, denied access to the 
political process, appeared unable to resolve these issues and the initiative shifted 
to younger, more radical elements advocating the violent expulsion of all Europeans 
from Kenya.2 The pre-Emergency phase in Kenya, roughly 1948 to 1952, was 
marked by low level organization by the Mau Mau movement in anticipation of a 
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confrontation with the government, the oathing and radicalization of sectors of the 
Kikuyu tribe, and the theft of arms and ammunition. Accurate intelligence on the 
Mau Mau was lacking, given that the Kenya Police had little representation in the 
Kikuyu heartland and Special Branch activities were generally limited to Nairobi. 
Moreover, the government, especially the Governor at that time, Sir Philip Mitchell, 
greatly underestimated the threat posed by Mau Mau and tended to ignore any 
contrary reports by administrative officers. Mau Mau activity, including the 
intimidation of loyal Kikuyu, arson attacks and the maiming of livestock, accelerated 
during 1952 to a point were the newly arrived Governor, Sir Evelyn Baring (later 
Lord Howick), recommended to the Colonial Secretary the declaration of a state of 
emergency in October.3 
Unfortunately for the Government of Kenya, the previously neglected and 
undersized Special Branch was incapable of identifying more than the more visible 
politically-active supporters and a limited number of Mau Mau's probable leaders. 
After the arrest sweep "decapitated" the political leadership of the movement, the 
initial blindness of Special Branch to most happenings in the native reserves made 
it unable to accurately track the growth and development of Mau Mau Militant 
(active fighters) and Passive Wing (non-combatants living in the native reserves and 
in Nairobi) support at the lower levels of the organization.4 This limited view 
provided by intelligence shaped the Government's perception of the problem. At 
first, the situation appeared similar to earlier difficulties faced in the West African 
colony of the Gold Coast. When a Gold Coast-style arrest sweep failed to quell the 
problem, the Kenya Government and the Security Forces responded with a 
repressive campaign similar to that seen in the early days of the Malaya campaign, 
while ironically, the British government and many in Kenya continued to deny that 
a Malaya-type situation was at hand. Only after the fledgling intelligence network 
in the native reserves began to provide some indications of the range of Mau Mau 
support, a message amplified by sporadic, often bloody attacks against both 
Africans and Europeans, did the government officials in London and Nairobi come 
to grips with the fact that a serious, widely-supported insurgency might be brewing. 
Kenya moved sluggishly to adopt the emergency and intelligence structures that 
were proving so successful in Malaya, while under constant pressure from the 
European settler community for stronger action. These delays also allowed 
Mau Mau to enjoy a relatively untroubled interlude during which it increased the 
size of its Militant Wing forces in the forests and secured its political support in 
Kikuyu areas.5 
During the spring of 1953, after an unexpected intensification of Mau Mau 
attacks against police posts and Kikuyu supporters of the government, there was a 
realization both in Nairobi and London that Kenya faced a full blown insurgency in 
rough parallel to Malaya, and therefore a more forceful response was required. The 
full-scale military campaign against Mau Mau did not begin until June 1953, seven 
months after the Emergency was declared, when the British government made 
Kenya an independent military command under a full general, allotted an second 
brigade headquarters and provided additional British battalions along with 
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increased Royal Air Force support. By October 1953, a third brigade headquarters 
and two more British battalions were added. But even with these additional 
manpower resources, progress was slow given the lack of operational intelligence 
about Mau Mau activities and the overwhelming support the movement enjoyed in 
Kikuyu areas. 
The powers given to the new commander-in-chief, General Sir George 
Erskine, fell well short of those enjoyed by General Sir Gerald Templer in Malaya. 
Erskine originally requested overall command of both the civil administration and 
the Security Forces, but this was refused on the grounds that, unlike Malaya, the 
emergency in Kenya was concentrated in a relative small geographic area, there-
fore, wide-ranging powers were not required. However, the threat of military rule 
was also kept as a last resort should the European settlers become excessively 
critical or obstructive of the Governments' handling of the campaign.6 
With the gearing-up of the activities of the Security Forces in Kenya after 
mid-1953 the obvious influence of Malaya operations in Kenya became apparent. 
The organization and expansion of Home Guard units, the food denial programme, 
villagization, the detention camp and rehabilitation system, and several other 
components of the campaign were draw directly from Malaya. In sorte cases, such 
as detention camps, government officials travelled to observe first hand the system 
in Malaya, although many of the re-education aspects of dealing with hard-core Mau 
Mau can be linked back to de-Nazification in post-war Germany. In fact, the use 
of the terms "white", "grey" and "black" in categorizing detainees in Kenya were 
the same terms used by the Allies to divide up German prisoners of war.7 At a 
tactical level, the Army's "Handbook on anti-Mau Mau Operations", issued 
in 1954, was based largely on a similar publication concerning Malaya published 
in 1952.8 
During 1953 a Malayan-style emergency committee system was established 
throughout the affected areas. Chaired by the senior administrative official, along 
with the ranking police and military officers, the so-called "three-legged stool" was 
responsible for the local conduct of the Emergency. Special Branch personnel were 
assigned to provincial and district headquarters in the native reserves and the 
European Settled Areas to assist in the collection and assessment of intelligence, 
and a system of intelligence committees roughly paralleled that of the emergency 
committee structure. By August 1953 the first of asmall number of military officers 
were posted to Special Branch as "Field Intelligence Officers" to aid in the 
development of military or "contact" intelligence to quickly engage the Mau Mau 
gangs, the best known and most effective of whom was Captain (later General Sir) 
Frank Kitson.9 
Malaya was not the only influence. When considering the problems of 
extensive Mau Mau activity in Nairobi, Erskine looked to the British experience in 
Palestine for an example. He based his own "Operation Anvil" the large-scale 
cordon and search of Nairobi in May 1954, on "Operation Shark," the cordon and 
search of Tel Aviv in 1946.10 By the time of Operation Anvil the Security Forces 
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had wrestled the initiative away from large Mau Mau gangs and, after securing 
Nairobi, began to force out the remaining Mau Mau organization from the Kikuyu 
Reserves and into the extensive forests around the Aberdares Mountains and Mount 
Kenya. As the Reserves became progressively more secure, security responsibility 
was transferred to the administration and the police, allowing the military to 
concentrate additional forces against the forest gangs. 
At various times during the emergency the colonial administration, through 
Special Branch, attempted to arrange for the mass surrender of Mau Mau fighters 
in the forests as a way of ending the Emergency quickly. The first surrender offer 
in August 195 3 was drawn directly from the experience in Malaya. In Kenya, direct 
talks between the government and the insurgents on two occasions in early 1954 and 
1955 came close to ending the insurgency outright, but for some bad luck and the 
great suspicions held by Mau Mau regarding to real intentions of the government. 
The final phase of the active insurgency starting in early 1955 saw the 
isolation and destruction of the remaining Mau Mau gangs and leaders in the 
Aberdares and Mount Kenya forests. After several months of relatively ineffective 
large scale forest operations and a final abortive attempt by Special Branch to 
negotiate a mass surrender, operations concentrated on the use of relatively small 
"tracker combat teams" of the Army, and "pseudo-gangs" composed of former Mau 
Mau members, under Special Branch guidance, willing to fight against the remaining 
gangs. During 1956 the effort to track down the remaining small number of gang 
leaders was waged by a specialized pseudo-gang force. While the pseudo-gang 
technique did not originate in Kenya - some aspects were used in both Palestine and 
Malaya - it was developed during counter-Mau Mau operations over a period of 
almost three years. Starting in 1954 in the European Settled Areas of Central 
Province, it became the most effective means of rooting out terrorists in the forests 
and of eliminating the remaining principal Mau Mau gang leaders." It is also in-
teresting as example of a technique that was not deliberately drawn from previous 
insurgencies, but used successfully and modified to a level of high sophistication. 
In October 1956 the last important Mau Mau leader, Dedan Kimathi, was captured 
and soon afterward the remaining military units were withdrawn from active service 
and the counterinsurgency period of the Emergency ended. 
In studying the Kenya Emergency one is struck how many ideas about the 
conduct of the campaign arrived from Malaya. But it is also important to recognise 
that many of the mistakes made in Malaya were repeated at great cost in Kenya, 
while other aspects of the campaign against the Communists simply did not work 
in the Kenyan political/security environment. For example, during the early months 
of the campaign, despite the lessons of Malaya, the use of extensive military sweeps, 
large-scale screening operations and collective punishment in the native reserves 
wasted valuable manpower and alienated many Kikuyu. Ambush tactics used in 
Malaya, which in turn were based on the Army's experience in Burma during the 
Second World War, were also found to be ineffective given the fact that Mau Mau 
possessed relatively few automatic or precision weapons and tended to withdraw 
after coming into contact with Army patrols rather than pressing the attack. As a 
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result, the Army adopted a number of unorthodox ambush tactics in the forest that 
were simply not applicable to any other theatre of operations. The detention of those 
suspected of supporting or participating in the insurgency was a regular aspect of 
British counterinsurgency. But only in Kenya did the use of detention reach such 
extreme levels, over 70,000 detainees at one point, a product of over-zealous 
administration officials and a military which, from the top down, saw the detention 
of suspects as a key element in efforts to rid the native areas of Mau Mau influence. 
The "hearts and minds" campaign, a cornerstone to the effort in Malaya, was 
generally unsuccessful in Kenya in winning over the Kikuyu population to the 
government side. At the height of the Emergency, the government estimated that 
around 95 percent of all Kikuyu either passively or actively supported Mau Mau or 
felt in sympathy with its goals. The detention camp system, the rehabilitation 
programme and a variety of economic incentives geared to draw people away from 
Mau Mau, while scoring some successes, failed to generate genuine support for the 
government cause among a majority of Kikuyu. In terms of the villagization 
programme, the government assessed that only a limited number of Kikuyu were 
likely to be drawn away from Mau Mau through the provision of increased social 
services, better living conditions and a degree of physical security. The remainder, 
in the eyes of the government, were not likely converts and, therefore, had to be dealt 
with harshly. This policy spawned two completely different styles of village, each 
with a separate security and political objective. In some areas "model" villages were 
built "... in which the huts are well-spaced, each wife having her own hut, and some 
with gardens. There is also room for a social centre and a few shops."12 In other parts 
of the native Reserves, however, the new villages reflected the government's 
determination to "make the conditions of life arduous for the resident population."13 
A so-called "punitive" village: 
... is built where the population are uncooperative. In nearly every 
case there is a pungi moat and a fence round the village. Such a village 
is invariable unpopular with the inhabitants as it is crowded, dirty and 
unhygienic. Their very unpopularity makes them, however, an 
excellent disciplinary measure.14 
Ultimately, it was force of arms and not a change of heart that defeated Mau Mau. 
Many Kikuyu simply gave up the fight after it became clear the superior power of 
the government would prevail and an end to the emergency might bring an end to 
theirdiscomfort. General Sir Gerald Lathbury, who replaced Erskine as Commander-
in-Chief in May 1955, believed Mau Mau had been suppressed rather than cured,15 
and reported to the War Office in early 1956: 
Although at the present time, greater numbers [of passive wing 
members] appear to be actively willing to assist Government, it 
cannot be said that this assistance has been offered as a result of a 
change of attitude towards Government, or abandonment of Mau Mau 
political aims.16 
An important aspect in the transfer of expertise and experience gained in 
other insurgencies to Kenya was the role of individuals. The military was probably 
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the most successful in this regard, aided by the very nature of the Army and the 
regular movement of units and personnel. Several battalions served both Malaya 
and Kenya and doubtless applied their previous experience to the new environment. 
The career path of many junior Army officers started in Palestine or Malaya from 
where they moved through the counterinsurgency pipeline and some eventually 
became senior officers commanding in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. Other 
officers were brought in for specific tasks. For example, Colonel Morcombe, a 
successful battalion commander in Malaya, took over the key post of Director, 
Kikuyu Guard. At the most senior levels, experience in the various emergencies was 
used to good advantage. General (later Field Marshal) Sir John Harding, served as 
Commander-in-Chief, Far East Land Forces, during die early years of the Malaya 
emergency and as CIGS (1952-55), was influential in seeing that the lessons of the 
Malayan experience were applied in Kenya.17 He later moved on to become 
Governor of Cyprus at the time of the EOKA terrorist offensive. 
The remarkable colonial career of Arthur Young provides a reminder that 
successful experience gained in one emergency situation does not guarantee results 
elsewhere and is in many ways is a double-edged sword. From 1950 to 1953 Colonel 
Young was given leave from his position as head of the London Metropolitan Police 
to take up a short term appointment as Commissioner of Police in Malaya where he 
reduced the size of the force and pressed for the adoption of British police methods, 
with some success. The next year Young drafted a report for the government of the 
Gold Coast after civil disturbances and recommended his Malaya solution to the 
government that the police be removed from the control of the colonial adminis-
tration and re-organized along British constabulary lines; his advice was largely 
ignored. After returning to London, Young was again called out to perform imperial 
service in 1954 in Kenya where the weight of die Mau Mau insurgency had revealed 
the need for new leadership in the greatly expanded Kenya Police ranks. Not 
surprisingly, Young recommended an independent status for the Police, outside the 
control of the colonial administration, and the adoption of more British standards 
in the conduct of police operations, especially in the discharge of weapons, the 
interrogation of prisoners and the prosecution of members of the Security Forces or 
others involved in the use of excessive force. While there was some sympadiy for 
Young's approach within the government, it was not seen as practical in the middle 
of a bloody fight between die supporters of the government and Mau Mau. As Sir 
Frederick Crawford, the Deputy Governor, observed: "... his objectives were as 
unrealizable as trying to turn the Royal Irish Constabulary into the Winchester 
Police in the middle of the Irish Rebellion."18 Another source of friction between 
Young and the government arose from a difference in the organizational structures 
of Kenya and Malaya. In Malaya, Young was part of the top decision-making group 
wiüi Templer; in Kenya the Commissioner of Police was not a member of die four-
man War Council which directed die campaign. These differences, combined with 
Young's sometimes abrasive personality, led to a series of disputes widi die 
Governor, ending in Young's resignation in December 1954. Thus, an attempt to 
directly transplant personnel and policies from one counterinsurgency to another 
ended in failure. As Young later remarked: "It is ironic that the same views and same 
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principles which ensured success in Malaya inevitably resulted in my resignation 
in Kenya."19 
Other police officers, such as Richard Catling, successfully applied their 
experience to new situations despite the difficulties involved in changing between 
colonies and continents. At the end of Britain's responsibilities in Palestine over 
400 Palestine Police took up positions in Malaya at the start of the emergency, 
eventually dominating the top ranks, including, at one time, the posts of Commissioner 
of Police and Deputy Commissioner. Undoubtedly, great advantage was gained 
from the experience of these men, but their ascendency also spawned some 
resentment within the original members of the police in Malaya. Catling, the 
Deputy Commissioner and one of the so-called "Palestinians", was passed over for 
promotion to the top job in favor of a career Malaya policemen. This, in turn, was 
fortunate for Kenya as Catling, a highly effective policeman, was posted as Deputy 
Commissioner in July 1954 and later succeeded Young as Commissioner. He 
helped reorganize and professionalize the Kenya Police, remaining at the helm until 
after Kenyan independence in 1963. 
The development of intelligence methods in Kenya during the Mau Mau 
campaign had an impact on several other colonies through the movement of top 
personnel within the various Special Branch organizations, very much in the "Man 
and a Plan" mold. For example, A.M. Macdonald, a veteran of Malaya and brought 
into Kenya from MI5 at the start of hostilities, went on to become Security Advisor 
to the Colonial Office, the top colonial intelligence position. Trevor Jenkins, 
Director of Intelligence and Security (DIS) arrived in Kenya in 1952 by way of the 
Gold Coast and was assigned in 1955 to re-organize a troubled Special Branch in 
Nigeria. Another Kenya DIS, John Prendergast, was sent to Cyprus as Director of 
Intelligence, along with two other high-ranking Kenya Special Branch officers. 
Prendergast later went on to yet another counterinsurgency campaign as head the 
intelligence organization in Aden. Ian Henderson, the single most effective Special 
Branch officer during the Kenya Emergency and key architect of the final version 
of pseudo-gangs, became a special advisor to Prime Minister Ian Smith in Rhodesia 
in 1965. Many of counter-Mau Mau tactics, including the use of pseudos, were 
evident in the campaign against nationalists guerillas in the late 1960s. In terms of 
military intelligence personnel, Frank Kitson went on to the campaigns in Malaya, 
Cyprus, Oman and Northern Ireland. Apart from his contributions regarding the 
development of pseudo-gangs and the gathering of "contact" intelligence, Kitson 
become a leading writer on the subject of counterinsurgency strategy and tactics. 
Institutions, however, are obviously not as flexible as individuals in transfer-
ring experience to new situations. After paying the price for the lack of any 
systematic collection of the knowledge gained in Palestine and Malaya, Kenya was 
equally guilty of not documenting and passing on the lessons learnt fighting Mau 
Mau. Unfortunately, but understandably, probably the last thing on the mind of a 
colonial official, policeman or Army officer in the heat of a complicated and brutal 
counterinsurgency campaign is his place in the history of low intensity operations. 
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There were some attempts at the time on the part of the British government, 
generally through the Colonial Office, to analyze the campaigns and to draw lessons 
for future use, but these were largely unsuccessful. In 1955, a committee of 
ministers under the chairmanship of Lord Swinton set out to examine the events 
leading up to the colonial conflicts Malaya, Kenya, British Guiana, Cyprus and 
others areas. General Templer, tasked with researching the study, had little success 
in piecing together the background to events or determining common threads. A 
typical response came from the department in the Colonial Office responsible for 
Malaya, in what must be a sobering message to any historians of the period: 
The events leading up the Emergency in Malaya took place nearly 
seven years ago. The memory of them has dimmed .... as [Colonial 
Office research] has shown, the material with which to write a history 
"is, from an historian's point of view, scanty and awkward". It is 
certainly not to be found in London.20 
Two years later, Colonial Office officials responsible for Cyprus lamented the lack 
of any historical record on other emergencies from which to draw: 
In dealing with the Cyprus Emergency problems we have from time 
to time felt a need for information regarding what we had done in 
Palestine but we usually drew a blank or had to rely on failing 
memories. As far as I know the emergencies in Malaya and Kenya 
were never written up in this way, but it is significant that the general 
course of events from the point of view of counter-terrorist operations 
has followed a remarkably similar pattern in Cyprus.21 
A similar observation is provided by A.M. Macdonald, a veteran of both India and 
Malaya who reorganized the intelligence organization in Kenya during the early 
years of the Mau Mau campaign (1952-53): 
I think that in the past we have failed to make proper use of previous 
experience. When the Emergency was declared in Kenya, that 
Government set about its problems of detention, propaganda, reha-
bilitation, etc. as if they were a new and strange phenomena. Cyprus 
in turn did much the same thing. I do not think that this is the fault of 
either Government. It was merely that the experience gained in 
Malaya was nowhere summarized in a form available for reference. 
Cyprus, in turn, suffered from a lack of systematic collation of 
experience gained in Kenya.22 
As mentioned earlier, the cross-posting of British battalions and personnel 
greatly aided the military, as an institution, in the transfer of experience gained in 
one insurgency to another. The higher ranking military officers, such as Harding 
and Templer, were likely to have exposure to more than one conflict. Unlike many 
members of the military, colonial police and Special Branch, however, most 
members of the colonial administration were unlikely to gain experience in 




Yet the military also had problems with its own institutional memory. As 
Thomas Mockaitis points out, the decentralizd nature of the British Army made it 
ideally suited for counterinsurgency, but also "singularly resistant to preserving and 
transmitting its experience in an orderly fashion."23 Given the British military's 
general disdain for doctrine, the extensive experience of pre-war British low 
intensity conflict was never formalizd into a coherent doctrine and even with the 
advent of the major post-war insurgencies, no extensive body of official literature 
emerged until the 1960s. 
In the specific case of Kenya, the military often played down the experience 
gained. It was not a glamorous campaign because it was not fighting Communism; 
a career was thought to be better served in Korea or Western Europe. Although the 
enemy in Kenya possessed considerable fieldcraft, they were badly armed and led, 
avoiding contact with the Army at all costs and not really a challenge to professional 
fighting men. As most of the fighting and the fatalities were inflicted by Kikuyu on 
Kikuyu, the Army viewed the situation more akin to inter-tribal score-settling than 
the "real" warfare; certainly not on a par with the triumph in Malaya. 
Kenya has long been regarded as the "poor sister" to Malaya in terms of its 
impact on the development of police and military thinking. However, as many 
African nations move from single-party states to multi-party democracies, unleashing 
the pent-up pressures of tribalism, the example of Kenya eventually may be viewed 
as the precursor of future conflict in Africa in the same way Malaya came to be seen 
as the model for anti-Communist counterinsurgency campaigning. 
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